

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 25 May 1962, at 11.20 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ATTA

(Nigeria)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA  
Mr. G.D. COMAR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. G.A. WESTRING  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D. MARK  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the forty-second meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I wish to raise a point of order as regards the draft declaration against war propaganda (ENDC/C.I/18) which has now been referred to the plenary meeting by the Committee of the Whole.

I should like first to say that I join with my colleagues in congratulating the two co-Chairmen on their successful reaching of an agreement. I should like to make it clear in what I am going to say that my government welcomes the agreement and that I shall be in a position, if we start a discussion of it more formally, to accept it ad referendum. But my point is that this document has come to us only today; my government has not had a chance to see it yet; and I would therefore like to propose, since there may be other delegations in the same position, that we should be given time to communicate the text to our governments before we take a final decision upon it in plenary.

At the same time, I think it is most desirable that we should reach formal agreement on the document, if we can do so, in plenary and thereafter should release it to the Press before we make our report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 1 June. Therefore, perhaps we may be able to fix a date --- shall we say next Tuesday? --- for a full consideration of this document in plenary, at which time representatives may make observations on behalf of their governments, if instructed to do so, and we could finally adopt the document and release it to the Press.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I merely wish to say that I support the suggestion just made by the United Kingdom representative. I think its adoption will make it possible for all of us to accept this important document next Tuesday on behalf of our respective governments.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I endorse what has just been said by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Mexico. There is, however, one point about which I am a little concerned. I think that the Press has already learnt that we were on the point of reaching agreement on war propaganda and I should not like it to be thought that any delay has arisen as a result of difficulties among us.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I think the problem might be solved by informing the Press that the Conference has taken a decision ad referendum, but that the attitude towards the text laid before us is nevertheless favourable.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): It has been suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom that time should be given to enable each representative to communicate with his government on the text before us (ENDC/C.I/18), and that perhaps on Tuesday of next week, after replies have been received from each government, we might be able to give formal approval to the document.

I observe the representative of Italy has given qualified approval to the suggestion which has been made by the representative of the United Kingdom, except for the reservation made in respect to the Press.

If there are no further observations, I shall take it that formal approval will be given to this document on Tuesday, 29 May.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): If it were the desire of our colleagues, I would most willingly fall in with the idea of including in our communique today a statement that we had received a document which had been passed to us unanimously by the Committee of the Whole and that delegations were referring it to their governments -- or if we like, we can say it has been accepted ad referendum --- and that it is hoped to finalize the question in the debate on Tuesday. If that meets the desire of the representative of Italy and our other colleagues, I would agree to some proposal of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): Is any representative opposed to the view just expressed, that in the communique for today we should state that the Committee of the Whole had referred this document to the plenary meeting and it was being studied by the respective governments?

It was so decided.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The position is that the governments are now to consider the document and it will be finally approved on Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I have a very short statement to make before calling on the representative of the United States.

I should like to take the liberty of putting forward a formal proposal on behalf of the eight non-aligned nations of this Committee regarding what we consider to be the best manner of giving more impetus to the work of the Committee within the next few months.

We are aware that considerable ground has been covered since our work began on 14 March. We have had, I think, some detailed discussion of stage I of the two plans which the Conference is considering, and we are now carrying out a further examination of stage II. This is without prejudice, of course, to other, parallel discussions which are taking place on stage I. Within the next few days or weeks we will have completed our discussion of stage III. At the same time, our work on the Committee of the Whole will have further advanced. This means that within the next few weeks every member of this Committee will have got a complete picture of the complexities of all the problems involved in the two plans.

The question which the eight non-aligned nations wish to raise is how to further advance our work at this stage in the most efficient manner and in a manner which will lead to positive results. It is our considered view that at the end of full discussion on all the issues involved up to stage III we should take full stock of the ground covered.

We are therefore proposing an adjournment to take place, if possible, between 15 June and 15 July, for a period to be agreed upon, so as to enable each representative to consult his government with a view to evaluation of the proposals made. We believe that more impetus would be given to our work when we resumed. We therefore submit to the co-Chairmen this formal proposal for an adjournment, and suggest that they consult their respective governments as to whether they are in sympathy with the purpose behind our proposal.

I trust that our co-Chairmen will be able to inform the Committee of the views of their respective governments early next week.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should be very happy, as one of the co-Chairmen, to consult my government on this point. If I understood you correctly, Mr. Chairman, you suggested that we suspend our work on Friday, 15 June, and that we resume on 15 July. If my calendar is correct, 15 July is a Sunday and 16 July is a

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Monday. I assume it would be equally agreeable if we suspended our work on 15 June and resumed on Monday, 16 July.

I merely raise this rather technical question just to be sure that we are all in agreement on the proposed time of the recess.

Mr. LALL (India): Just to avoid any misunderstanding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the delegation of India has no objection to your proposal; but I should like to make it clear that this is not a governmental position so far as the Government of India is concerned. We are not either particularly for a recess or particularly against it. This is an administrative matter which we in our delegation think should be decided by administrative agreement in this forum of ours. But I would like to make it clear that we have not taken a governmental position on the issue of a recess. I feel it is essential to say this, because my government is not committed one way or another to a position in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): Since there are no further observations on this matter, I now call upon the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In the course of our many plenary meetings over the past two weeks, a great deal of discussion has been devoted to problems of adequate and effective control over the execution of the measures of disarmament to be incorporated into the first stage of our treaty. Today I should like to focus my remarks mainly on these problems, which are so crucial to our deliberations. Before getting to this main subject, I would like to say something about two different, but nevertheless related, matters.

Firstly, it would be well to consider again the general disarmament framework in which the control arrangements which we propose would find their place. Secondly, we must make clear the connexion which exists between each disarmament measure and the steps for verification of its implementation.

Let me be clear that the United States is firmly and irrevocably committed to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Moreover, we are, as members know, one of the two nations which worked out the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) for reaching our disarmament goal. Both the general objective of a disarmed and peaceful world and the means and procedure



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for creating such a world, set forth in this Joint Statement, were accepted unanimously by the General Assembly.

The fourth and fifth of the Agreed Principles set forth quite explicitly that the disarmament goal is to be reached by several balanced stages. The second principle fixes the aims of disarmament, such as the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, which are to be achieved by the end of the disarmament process. Nothing is said in the Agreed Principles about the need to complete, or the desirability of completing, total disarmament in any particular field or in any particular category of weapons in any one stage before we have reached the goal of general and complete disarmament.

I have mentioned this question because the Committee now has before it the disarmament plan sponsored by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) which, while seeking a gradual stage-by-stage reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, also calls for the elimination of all delivery vehicles in the first stage, except those converted to peaceful uses; those converted to peaceful uses would, of course, remain. More than that: while proposing no reduction of nuclear weapons or fissionable material in the first stage, the Soviet draft proposes the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the second stage.

To recapitulate: the Soviet plan calls for complete elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, but says nothing about nuclear weapons themselves; and it calls for complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the second stage.

From what I have just said, it must be apparent to the members of our Conference that the Soviet approach to disarmament does not in any sense flow naturally from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. Indeed, the concept of stages and the requirement of balance imply a gradual progression towards the disarmament goals which are to be fully effectuated by the end of the last stage. This is the reasonable approach adopted by the United States outline of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30).

Nevertheless, our Soviet colleagues persist in advancing their draconian proposals, and they have been attempting to popularize them by saying that their adoption would end the danger of nuclear war by the end of the first stage. Now I submit that this conveniently overlooks the availability of those delivery vehicles -- all types of nuclear delivery vehicles -- that would presumably be converted to peaceful uses, because those would remain.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As I have just noted, one of the objectives of this Conference is indeed to end the danger of nuclear war, and all delegations here fervently desire this -- I do not think there can be any question of that. The problem, therefore, is one of timing. It is one of how to devise the most practical means for achieving this end. We believe that the approach in the United States plan is the most practical, and for the following reasons:

First, each present major Power grouping is now familiar with the existing world military situation, and each major Power grouping has adjusted its strategic thinking to these conditions. The gradual across-the-board reduction -- as proposed in the United States plan -- of military establishments from 100 per cent to zero during the three stages of the plan would maintain the existing pattern, although in steadily less dangerous scope, until the end of stage III, when general and complete disarmament would have been attained. So there would be no need for a major readjustment to a fundamentally new strategic situation in each stage. Under our plan of gradual reduction by three stages, from 100 per cent to zero, across the board, we would not create new elements of international instability while carrying out general and complete disarmament, and this is important.

Secondly, closely tied to the foregoing is the important question of balance. The fifth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles requires that the execution of disarmament measures themselves should not provide any party with a military advantage. My delegation believes that a first-stage liquidation of all nuclear delivery vehicles would in itself produce a serious strategic imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries and their allies, including Communist China.

Thirdly, again closely related to the first two points is the fact that the Soviet approach would, we submit, vastly complicate the actual negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Why? Because we not only would have to agree upon measures for the reduction and elimination of existing weapons and production facilities but would also have to negotiate, for each stage, a new mix or composition of each party's military establishment satisfactory to all the parties. But would this new mix be satisfactory? There's the rub. Would it be satisfactory -- or would it be as satisfactory as the present mix, gradually reduced?

Fourthly, as many speakers here have pointed out, the implementation of general and complete disarmament depends to a very considerable degree upon an improvement in the climate of international trust and confidence. This, as we all know, is an

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intangible factor and one of the most difficult to do anything about. Clearly, however, the process of bringing about an increase in confidence must, again, be gradual; there cannot be any sudden or climatic development. This increase in confidence must arise from a multiplicity of circumstances, one of the most important of which could be the successful progressive implementation of a disarmament treaty, accompanied by an improvement in the peace-keeping machinery.

In this situation, then, we cannot expect to jump immediately to measures of an extremely radical nature. To conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament is radical enough, without also providing in the very first stage for the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, upon which parties to the treaty -- especially those, such as the United States, with long supply lines and diverse commitments throughout the world which must be reached by air, space or water --- have come to rely so heavily for their defence. This is a fact which we must face.

Fifthly, as a number of representatives have said here --- and I believe that this proverb exists in all languages -- the best is the enemy of the good. There are great practical difficulties standing in the way of a first-stage cut of 100 per cent in nuclear delivery vehicles, or, indeed, a 100 per cent cut of anything else in the first stage. So I appeal to my colleagues in the Conference to see that we do not get ourselves into a position where we cannot move at all because we cannot move far enough.

My delegation has noted several times that under any plan for total disarmament there must be a progression from a 100 per cent armed condition to a condition of zero armaments, whether in one stage or in three stages. The Soviet Union, I submit, has not explained at all, or at least has not explained satisfactorily, how it expects to accomplish its complete liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, nor how it would arrange fully adequate and complete control measures, not only in the first stage but in the various steps during the process of reduction. On the contrary, the Soviet delegation, I am sorry to say, has continued to repeat its view -- and we have not been able to persuade it that this view is not correct -- that the United States is seeking an exorbitant degree of inspection, which the Soviet delegation calls espionage, in the first stage. I submit that this is not an accurate statement of my government's position; but nevertheless it is a view very deeply held by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As we have stressed, under the United States plan only a limited amount of the territory of the Soviet Union would be subject to inspection in the first stage. That is, under the United States plan, the amount of territory subject to inspection would be proportionate to the amount of disarmament achieved. However, under the Soviet plan, as I will indicate in greater detail later, there would, indeed, have to be an arrangement for the possibility of an all-embracing inspection of all Soviet territory. I do not see how one can escape the fact that if there is 100 per cent elimination there must be 100 per cent inspection.

These are some of the reasons why my delegation believes that the United States outline is the more practical approach to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. I wish to point out, in addition, that we are also concerned with the threat of other kinds of war. As the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, pointed out the other day, a number of the countries represented at this table suffered millions of casualties in so-called conventional warfare during the First World War and the Second World War. We believe, after careful study, that the imbalance of the Soviet proposal, which tries to do too much in stage I, might well make conventional war more likely rather than less likely. There may be differences in points of view on this, but that is what we believe.

I also wish to point out that the Soviet proposal would not eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage, because it would not eliminate any nuclear weapons until the second. Why is this so? While the Soviet Union proposes to eliminate all military vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, it permits conversion of military rockets to peaceful uses under article 5 of the Soviet draft -- rockets which could presumably be reconverted with relative ease -- and it would not touch civilian vehicles capable of delivery of nuclear weapons. I have checked this fact, and I am informed that almost all types of existing commercial aircraft could be utilized to carry nuclear weapons. I am informed that external loading devices such as the Second World War delivery systems could be added to certain kinds of civilian aircraft with relative ease. Indeed, I am advised that nuclear weapons could be discharged through existing doorways in many cases. While the accuracy would not be as great as with present military systems, which are designed for target accuracy, the range of destruction of nuclear weapons as their megaton size increases makes accuracy considerably less important than with conventional weapons.

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To illustrate my point more clearly, and to be more specific about it, I am advised that the long-range Soviet turbo-prop transport which brought Chairman Khrushchev on his visit to the United States in 1959 --- and we were very glad indeed to welcome him and to have him with us --- is a civilian version of a Soviet long-range bomber. I am advised that this type of transport could easily carry nuclear weapons. the problems of actual conversion depending on the size and the weight of the weapon and the accuracy of delivery desired. What I have said about planes is also of course true of civilian ships, railroad trains and trucks. Nuclear weapons could be hidden in any of these, set to go off at a predetermined time when the vehicle was scheduled to stop at a city or other target. I mention this in order to present in some specific detail the complexities of this problem of 100 per cent destruction and 100 per cent inspection and control.

Before getting to control problems themselves, I should like to say a few words about the connexion between disarmament and control. As far as my delegation is concerned, the basic link is established by the terms of the sixth Agreed Principle. Here it is provided that each and every disarmament measure must be accompanied by a complementary measure providing for adequate and effective international control. There is an even more basic reason why measures for the reduction of arms are inseparably linked with arrangements for their verification. It is a fact of life that no country will strip itself of its arms unless it is sure that its potential enemies are also doing so in equal measure. In their recent interventions, the representatives of Burma and the United Arab Republic both recognized the mistrust that exists between the two sides and the deep need for effective verification so that neither side would have to rely on the unconfirmed word of the other.

For these reasons it is, I submit, impossible, at least under existing conditions, to consider measures to reduce or to eliminate arms without at the same time considering reliable and effective methods for their verification.

In this connexion it has been suggested by some representatives that the United States is not really interested in eliminating the nuclear threat, because it has a first-stage proposal to examine:

"remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles." (ENDC/30, p.10)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Let me say this in response: First, at the very beginning of our outline treaty on general and complete disarmament we state as our objective the elimination of all nuclear weapon stockpiles remaining at the disposal of States, as follows:

"2 (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction ..." (ENDC/30, p.2)

Second, on page 17, section H, paragraph 1 of stage I of the United States outline treaty we propose an undertaking by all States -- and "all", I submit, includes the United States -- to refrain from threat or use of force, including specifically nuclear warfare, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. What could be plainer than that? How could it be expressed in any simpler or more comprehensive language?

Third, in stage I the United States proposes that all production -- I repeat, all production -- of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons be stopped (ibid., section C, para.1, p.8). The Soviet draft puts off this important step to stage II. I refer to article 22, sub-division 2(a) of the Soviet draft. The United States in its plan, also proposes in stage I that when production of fissionable materials has ceased an agreed quantity -- that is a quantity to be arrived at by negotiation; we suggest 50,000 kilogrammes, but we are quite willing to discuss a higher figure -- of weapons grade U-235 should be transferred to peaceful uses. That is paragraph 2 of section C of the United States draft. This would be a major step in reducing the nuclear weapon potential of each side. In comparison, the Soviet draft does not contain a provision for the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful purposes until stage II. I refer to page 14, article 22, sub-division 1 of the Soviet draft.

Fourth, with respect to our stage I proposal to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles, if an international nuclear experts study could be commenced at an appropriate time during these negotiations there might be no remaining unresolved questions by the time our treaty on general and complete disarmament was drafted. Members will recall the suggestion of our colleague, the representative of the United Arab Republic, at our meeting of 21 May (ENDC/PV.40, p.16). If this study is successful we would be happy to agree to further effective means for dealing with nuclear stockpiles. However, if that examination cannot be conducted until stage I starts, we shall certainly delay our progress in accomplishing the goal we all seek -- the elimination of all nuclear weapon stockpiles now in the hands of

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four nations. Our draft proposes a reduction of such stockpiles to minimum levels in stage II and their complete elimination in stage III, in the light of the steps taken earlier.

What does this mean? It seems to me we are faced with this situation: We agree that the nuclear weapons which the parties possess must be eliminated: We agree that means must be found to assure each side that the other side is taking the same steps that it is taking toward this elimination. We agree that this problem of verification is a difficult one; the United States does not claim that it has the final answer to it but we are ready to agree on the formation of the necessary study group to seek that answer diligently, patiently and constructively at an appropriate time during these negotiations on our treaty.

From a review of discussions on verification that have been conducted in the past month or so, it is plainly evident that distinctly different concepts on this specific subject have been introduced by the United States and the Soviet Union. These differences involve scope, timing and emphasis. As we approach completion of the initial review of stage I, I feel it essential to re-emphasize the highly critical role that verification measures play in the formulation and implementation of a disarmament treaty.

I would therefore like to call attention again to the two important points on control made in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, namely, that:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations.

.....

"This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification." (ENDC/5, pp.2,3)

On 4 May our Chairman for today, the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Atta, distilled the true essence of the relationship between verification, disarmament and confidence in the statement which I now take pleasure in quoting:

"Total verification, total disarmament and total confidence-generating measures are one and the same" (ENDC/PV.31, p.6).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Thus, these three elements which Mr. Atta then outlined are so interdependent that the success of a disarmament treaty in the current context necessarily rests upon their balanced integration into the programme and, like a chain, the programme will be only as strong as its weakest link.

At the plenary meeting on 21 May, Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, expressed a parallel opinion:

"... control and verification should be considered the safety valves of the disarmament machinery. On their adequacy, effectiveness and strictness depend the amount of confidence generated and the final success of the operation." (ENDC/PV.40, p.18)

From the earliest point in our Conference the attitude of the Soviet Union on mutual trust, or the lack thereof, was made quite clear when Foreign Minister Gromyko stated:

"Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word... Nor do we expect others to take us at our word." (ENDC/PV.2, p.11)

Although the representative of the Soviet Union suggested a few days ago that verification should be separated from disarmament, in his intervention yesterday he agreed with the statements of Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, and Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic. Indeed, our Soviet colleague spoke of the "close relationship" between disarmament and control (ENDC/PV.41, p.44). However, in examining the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2), I note a definite trend toward relegating verification to a subordinate and less effective role in the overall programme. Further, the Soviet draft treaty has set forth considerably less than full measures, in that verification is applied only to the actual reduction of arms and not to the true criterion of the threat to the other side, that is, retained armaments. This is a real problem for all of us. It is a matter of substance and one to which we must address our most careful attention. I submit that it cannot be solved by semantics. One cannot solve it by saying that one is in favour of verification after there is general and complete disarmament, but not in favour of verification of armaments. I submit that this may be nice semantics, but it does not solve the fundamental problem.

Several specific points now come to mind. I would like Mr. Zorin to explain in some detail, if he would, his concept of an effective inspection programme designed to verify the 100 per cent elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in



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stage I. All members are aware of the rather short duration of stage I in the Soviet draft. In view of this short duration of stage I, I ask my Soviet colleague: Would this not require a very large number of inspectors over the entire national territory of a State, including the Soviet Union, at a very early point in the overall disarmament programme? How can our Soviet colleague reconcile charges that the United States progressive zonal inspection idea, which relates the amount of disarmament to the amount of inspection, would constitute espionage?

I do not see how he can justify that charge when the personnel requirements of the zonal system in the same period, by virtue of the much smaller geographical areas involved and the lower level of disarmament measures set forth in the United States treaty outline, would, I think, be considerably lower than the extraordinary personnel requirements for the inspection and verification attendant on 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles alone.

Our Soviet colleague seemed to admit yesterday that there was some difficulty involved in the verification of a 100 per cent elimination. He said:

"How this can be carried out in practice is a question that obviously requires clarification and a concrete study of the methods of verification." (ENDC/PV.41, p.34)

I for one am very glad to have Mr. Zorin's agreement that verification is indeed a problem requiring further study.

My other point is closely related. I would like to understand clearly and in greater detail what our Soviet colleague meant, in connexion with 100 per cent elimination of nuclear carriers, by his statement on 4 May that:

"I am telling you that we agree to 100 per cent verification, and I add:

100 per cent throughout the territory of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.31, p.50)

This statement, as made, would seem to indicate complete access to all Soviet territory by the international disarmament organization inspectors throughout the fifteen-month duration of the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty. But I ask: would it include some check to see that no military delivery vehicles had been retained and that no civilian vehicles -- planes, ships, railroad trains or trucks -- had been converted for use as nuclear weapon vehicles? How do you ascertain this fact? Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom, specifically examined this point at the thirty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference (ENDC/PV.39, p.43) and added that he understood that Mr. Zorin had amended the aforementioned statement by making it

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clear that 100 per cent verification on the whole territory of the Soviet Union meant only the opportunity to look at the destruction of the particular nuclear weapon vehicles, wherever that might occur within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Zorin appeared to confirm this limitation yesterday when he said that the Soviet Union was:

"... prepared to provide an opportunity to carry out full verification of the 100 per cent destruction"

I repeat, "prepared to provide an opportunity to carry out full verification of the 100 per cent destruction" -- "of such armaments, that is, of the armaments which are to be destroyed at a given stage." (ENDC/PV.41, p.34)

This is, after all, consistent with the negotiations Mr. McCloy and I had with Mr. Zorin last summer, and with the position Mr. Zorin took in the exchange of letters following agreement on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, (ENDC/5, annex II) and I submit that until the Soviet draft treaty is revised to provide otherwise we have no real assurance that any other control than inspection of the particular weapons on the bonfire would be provided for arms reductions. I would therefore invite my Soviet colleague to provide us with treaty language which we could examine so that we could be satisfied on this point.

I would like now to say a word or two on the subject of the so-called veto in connexion with verification. As we have pointed out a number of times, I believe, in our discussions of transition, article 42 of the Soviet draft makes the control council the most important organ of the international disarmament organization, and in the Soviet draft this organization would have the power to, among other things, supervise the establishment and operation of the verification system. Article 42 of the Soviet draft provides further that all non-procedural votes would be by a two-thirds majority, and it states that the "composition of the council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world."

(ENDC/2, p.26)

From long experience we know that this phrase, "proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world", to which we have often taken exception, means in substance a troika. We suggested earlier that the Soviet Union probably had in mind a control council similar to that which it proposed for the test ban treaty, namely, with four States from the side of the United States and the United Kingdom, four from the Soviet side, and three not associated with either side. To my knowledge, this has not been disputed.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

This suggests, then, that the Soviet bloc, which almost invariably votes as a bloc in matters of deep interest to the Soviet Union, would have more than one-third of the votes in the control council, that is, four out of the eleven, and a veto over every substantive action of the council under the Soviet draft. Thus the Soviet Union would appear to be proposing a veto over even the very limited verification arrangements proposed in its draft of a treaty. Indeed, it would seem to me that it could prevent the international disarmament organization from even watching the bonfire of the particular nuclear delivery vehicles to be destroyed in the first stage.

Then, if I read the Soviet draft correctly --- if I do not, I would like to be so informed --- it would appear to provide for even a second veto over significant aspects of disarmament verification, because article 40 of that draft provides:

"All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/2, p.25)

What does this phrase in this draft article, "international peace and security", mean? Examination of the United Nations Charter and of the proceedings in the United Nations shows that this phrase has a very broad meaning in international practice, virtually as broad as the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council itself. What do we find if we look at the United Nations Charter? Article 24 of the Charter defines the Security Council's responsibility as the "maintenance of international peace and security". Article 11 of the United Nations Charter indicates clearly that the phrase "maintenance of international peace and security" includes "disarmament and the regulation of armaments". Therefore, by providing for Security Council action on "all questions connected with safeguarding international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty", the Soviet draft appears to have given to all the permanent members of the Security Council a veto over all questions having to do with disarmament which may arise under the treaty. It would appear to me that this clearly includes a veto over whether any important verification action, such as an inspection for hidden nuclear weapons, need be taken.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

If there is any doubt that this is the intention of the Soviet draft language, let me recall to the Conference that on 18 October 1949 the Soviet Union vetoed the adoption by the Security Council of a plan for a census and verification of the armed forces and conventional armaments of States Members of the United Nations. (452nd meeting) This plan had been reported to the Security Council by the Commission on Conventional Armaments as a part of its early work in the disarmament field. In considering this plan, the Security Council was, of course, attempting to exercise its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I call this to members' attention as evidence that the Soviet Union has already exercised its veto power in the Security Council over questions related to the maintenance of international peace and security by vetoing a census and verification of armed forces and armaments. I may be misreading this language in the Soviet draft treaty, and if this is not the intention I would respectfully suggest to my Soviet colleague that this language be deleted, for it seems to me that in its present form it is clearly susceptible of the interpretation I have given. As I have said, if I am mistaken in my reading of the Soviet draft, I should be very happy to be corrected. It seems to me that a close examination of the Soviet draft reveals, not just one, but two vetoes over the important actions which would have to be taken to verify the carrying out of the treaty provisions.

In conclusion, it appears to my delegation that we must of course continue to pursue with great diligence our work here towards general and complete disarmament. We must let nothing stop us in carrying out that project. I want to make it clear that in my remarks here I am trying only to point up what is intended in the proposed United States draft treaty and what we find from our study of the Soviet draft treaty. But I want to call attention to the fact that we cannot accomplish our task of arriving at general and complete disarmament by merely looking at the language in our treaty or in the Soviet draft treaty. We have to address ourselves to what we find in the world of today, whether we like it or not. We have got to address ourselves to world conditions as they are. We have got to look with a hard sense of reality at the current world environment and at the current situation with respect to how we can carry out general and complete disarmament control and verification and how these measures that each of us provides are going to operate. I have tried to be very frank in stating my belief that this question of transition is a very real one for us all.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Our Italian colleague made some very interesting, and I thought very pertinent, observations yesterday with respect to how this matter might be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations even if there were no provisions about transition. But I do submit that it is essential that we face up to this basic issue and that agreement be reached on it. We are all here for a single purpose: to arrive at a treaty on general and complete disarmament, to draft it at as early a date as possible and to start implementing it. But I submit that it will do us little good in practice to avoid some of these difficult practical problems and that in the final analysis an agreement on general and complete disarmament will mean very little in practical terms if this vital problem of verification is not solved realistically.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Atta, the representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Mexico, Italy, the Soviet Union, Nigeria, the United States and India.

"Arrangements for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole have been approved by the Committee of the Whole.

"The Conference has received from the Committee of the Whole a declaration against war propaganda, which has been adopted unanimously by the Committee of the Whole. Definitive action will be taken by the Conference on Tuesday, 29 May 1962, after consultation with Governments.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 28 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

